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A number of existing studies on insurance demand report an ap-
parently pathological result that insurance is a luxury good. Using
cross-country insurance data and national wealth data, we resolve
this spurious puzzle. While we found that the income elasticity of
insurance demand is larger than unity, the wealth elasticity of insur-
ance demand is smaller than unity at least for upper-middle and high
wealth countries.
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1 Theoretical Background
There is no doubt that insurance plays an important role in the modern world.
However, our understanding of the insurance demand is limited contrary to
our common sense. In particular, due to the lack of household-level data of
insurance, there are very few existing empirical works on insurance demand.1
As a result, most existing studies only use macro data. A number of such
works report an apparently pathological result that insurance is a luxury
good, i.e. the income elasticity of insurance demand is greater than unity,
e.g. Beenstock et al. (1988), Outreville (1990), and Enz (2000).
However, the standard model of insurance demand speciﬁes the demand
function as a function of the premium (price) and the ‘initial wealth’ rather
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1There are some exceptions, though. Galabova and Lester (2001) uses Eurostat
NewCronos household budget survey and the World Bank Living Standards Measurement
Survey, while Dixon, Clancy, Seabury and Overton (2006) collects and uses household
data for the US National Flood Insurance Program.
1than income. It is well known that the optimal proportionate coverage is de-
creasing (constant) in the initial wealth if DRRA (CRRA)2 when the initial
wealth and the loss exposure are proportionate with each other and the load-
ing factor is strictly positive, because the optimal insurance coverage choice
problem can be reformulated as a static portfolio choice problem (see, for ex-
ample, Schlesinger [2000]). Since it is most likely that the preferences of the
people exhibit DRRA or CRRA, the wealth elasticity of insurance demand
should not be greater than unity as long as the loss exposure (insurable) is
proportionate with the wealth level.
This paper aims at ﬁlling this gap in the existing literature using cross-
country insurance data and national wealth data. Note that it may well be
the case that the disparity in wealth across countries is far larger than that in
income, since wealth is really an accumulation of surplus from income. Also,
the growth rate of wealth may well be much higher than that of income over
time. Hence, the result that insurance is a luxury good may be proved to be
spurious once we use the initial wealth instead of income.
2 Empirical Strategy
The insurance demand is crucially aﬀected by the loss exposure, and thus,
we need to control for it when we test the theory empirically. In particular,
the loss exposure is aﬀected by the structure of uncertainty, which in turn
is determined by the structure of the economy. However, it is impossible
to know the true structure of the economy. Accordingly, we need to make
some assertion about it. The simplest one is such that the loss exposure of
an economy is proportionate with its aggregate wealth, an assumption we
impose in our analysis.3
Nevertheless, there are several factors we may need to control for. First,
most insurance products are based on the logic of the strong law of large
numbers, and thus, the population size may matter. Namely, when the
population is larger, the premiums become fairer, and thus, the aggregate
insurance demand becomes larger. Secondly, not only the level and size of
the wealth but also the wealth distribution within a country may have an
impact on the aggregate insurance demand; the aggregate insurance demand
should be smaller when the wealth inequality is larger. To control for this,
we use income Gini coeﬃcients from Deininger and Squire (1996), because
income and wealth have a strong positive correlation in general, although
we should use wealth Gini coeﬃcients if such data are available. Hence,
the theory predicts that the aggregate insurance demand is smaller when
the income Gini coeﬃcient is higher. Finally, the insurance demand may
be aﬀected by transactions costs, e.g. the lack of access to formal insurance
markets and the lack of contract enforceability. To control for the former
2DRRA and CRRA are decreasing and constant relative risk aversion, respectively.
3It appears that we need to control for natural disasters, since they aﬀect the loss
exposure, and that, some regions are more prone to natural disasters than others. However,
insurance for natural disasters is almost non-existent in disaster-prone regions, and thus,
these are probably irrelevant in our context.
2aspect, we employ King and Levine’s (1993) ﬁnancial depth measure, i.e.
liquid liabilities shares of GDP, because a higher share most likely implies
lower transactions costs in formal insurance markets. Regarding the latter
aspect, we utilize the contract enforceability variable from Knack and Keefer
(1995). With a poor contract enforceability, formal insurance transactions
become more expensive relative to informal mutual insurance, and thus, the
aggregate insurance demand becomes lower.
Based on the above observations, we use the following partially linear
regression model, that extends the linear regression model to include a non-
parametric component, to test the wealth elasticity of the insurance demand:4
Di
Wi
= f (Wi) + Xib + !i, (1)
where Di is country i’s aggregate insurance demand (premium), Wi is country
i’s aggregate wealth, b is a vector of parameters, Xi is a vector of variables of
country i for which the regression model is controlled, and !i is the error term.
The left hand side of the equation is the proportion of the aggregate premium
against the initial wealth. Hence, when f!(Wi) < (>) 0, the proportion is
decreasing (increasing) in the initial wealth at Wi, and consequently, the
wealth elasticity of the insurance demand is less (more) than unity at Wi.5
As for the data, we use the cross-country non-life insurance premium data
from Swiss Re’s sigma world insurance data. Also, for the population data,
we use Penn World Table Version 6.1 (Heston, Summers and Aten [2002]),
while for the wealth data, we use Kunte et al. (1998). More speciﬁcally, to
represent the initial wealth, we use produced assets, which consist of build-
ings and structures, machinery and equipment, and urban land. Because
produced assets data are available only for 1994, our analysis focuses on
1994. The data on the income Gini coeﬃcients, liquid liability as share of
GDP, and contract enforceability are averages over the period 1980-95 and
are extracted from Levin and Demirguc-Kunt (2001).
In order to estimate the semiparametric regression model of linear par-
tial equation (1), we use Lokshin’s (2006) algorithm, which is based on the
method of diﬀerencing. Table 1 summarizes the estimation results of the
parametric part of equation (1). The contract enforceability variable has pos-
itive and statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcients, suggesting that a better contract
enforcement leads to a higher aggregate insurance demand. Speciﬁcations
(I) and (II) in Table 1 replicate the results of the greater-than-unity income
elasticity of insurance demand by replacing Wi with real GDP per capita.
Figure 1 shows the estimated nonparametric part of speciﬁcation (II) that
is apparently an increasing function, suggesting that the income elasticity of
insurance demand is larger than unity. Figure 2 reports the results of esti-
mated nonparametric part of speciﬁcation (III) in Table 1 by using the wealth
variable. This ﬁgure indicates that the wealth elasticity of insurance demand
4See Section 5 of Ichimura and Todd (2006) for reference of semi-parametric estima-
tions.
5It is straightforward to show that f" (Wi) = ∂( Di
Wi)/∂Wi = (η − 1) Di
W 2
i
where η is the
wealth elasticity of the insurance demand.
3is smaller than unity at least for upper-middle and high wealth countries. As
for the low wealth countries, the wealth elasticity appears to be greater than
unity; this may suggest that there are some unknown aspects that prevent
people from purchasing formal insurance in developing countries.
3 Concluding Remarks
We have found that the apparently pathological result that insurance is a
luxury good is spurious, once we use wealth data instead of income data. This
appears to support the predictions of the theory. However, interpretation of
our results requires some care.
As Mossin (1968) argues, the deﬁnition of the initial wealth requires some
care. In a static problem, the initial wealth should be the marketable assets,
since the decisions to be made are all immediate. However, in a dynamical
situation, there is a sequence of decisions, and thus, the budget set involves
the future stochastic income stream, too. It follows that the initial wealth
should reﬂect the present value of the future income stream. In the latter
case, the total wealth data from Kunte et al. (1998) is more appropriate since
it includes human resources, which are mainly reﬂecting the future income
stream. However, this requires a test of a more complicated model, which is
beyond the scope of the current paper.
Moreover, the current paper is only using macro data, and thus, we cannot
conclude anything about individual insurance demand. This requires an
empirical study using micro data. In other words, the usual caveats for
empirical studies using macro data apply here.
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